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In 2009, President Barack Obama nominated Judge Sonia Sotomayor
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to the U.S. Supreme
Court to replace the retiring Justice David Souter. It was a historic
appointment, as she became the first Hispanic justice and the third female
to serve on the high court.1
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1. Nicandro Iannacci, Sonia Sotomayor, the People’s Justice, CONST. DAILY: BLOG (May 26,
2016), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/sonia-sotomayor-the-peoples-justice [https://perma.cc/U9
4U-DP4A].
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Obama praised his first Supreme Court appointment, stating: “Over
a distinguished career that spans three decades, Judge Sotomayor has
worked at almost every level of our judicial system, providing her with a
depth of experience and a breadth of perspective that will be invaluable as
a Supreme Court justice.”2 President Obama was the third Chief Executive
to nominate Sotomayor to a position in the federal judiciary. President
George H. W. Bush nominated her to a federal district court position, and
President Bill Clinton nominated her to the Second Circuit.
Justice Sotomayor had what Linda Greenhouse, a New York Times
Supreme Court expert, called a “stirring life story and impressive
résumé.”3 She rose from poverty in a Bronx housing project to become a
New York City prosecutor, a federal district court judge, and a federal
appeals court judge.4
Sotomayor’s influence on the Court has been profound. She is a
consistent defender of constitutional freedoms and individual rights.5 Her
solicitude for constitutional freedoms is shown most starkly in her Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence; Matthew T. Mangino has called her a “fierce”
defender of the Fourth Amendment.6 Two legal commenters have
observed that her “depth of exposure to criminal justice issues is
unsurpassed among contemporary Supreme Court justices.”7 An astute
student commentator observed from Sotomayor’s lower court judicial
record that she had a “tendency to rule in favor of Fourth Amendment
protection over governmental intrusion.”8 Another commentator stated
that the Fourth Amendment is “more or less safe in [her] hands.”9

2. Transcript of Obama-Sotomayor Announcement, CNN (May 26, 2009), http://www.cnn.com
/2009/POLITICS/05/26/obama.sotomayor.transcript/index.html [https://perma.cc/7NNS-URC2].
3. Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Every Justice Creates a New Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/opinion/27greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/R9DR-2EEW].
4. Daniel Politi, SCOTUS Nominee Stumps GOP, SLATE (May 27, 2009), https://slate.com/news
-and-politics/2009/05/obama-nominates-first-hispanic-to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/3
VLD-VADK].
5. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Sonia Sotomayor: Defending Individuals and Constitutional
Freedoms, F REEDOM F. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.freedomforum.org/2020/08/10/justice-soniasotomayor-defending-individuals-and-constitutional-freedoms/ [https://perma.cc/YN5A-Q3D3].
6. Matthew T. Mangino, Opinion, Sotomayor Fierce Defender of the Fourth Amendment,
WAXAHACHIE DAILY LIGHT (June 1, 2018), https://www.waxahachietx.com/opinion/20180601/
matthew-t-mangino-sotomayor-fierce-defender-of-fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/F3A7-798N].
7. Christopher E. Smith & Ksenia Petlakh, The Roles of Sonia Sotomayor in Criminal Justice
Cases, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 457, 458 (2017).
8. William Sanders, Note, The Future of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 11 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 479, 508 (2013).
9. Mark Joseph Stern, Get Off My Lawn! Sonia Sotomayor’s Defense of Property and Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment Puts Thomas and Alito to Shame, SLATE (May 29, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/05/in-collins-v-virginia-sonia-sotomayor-mounts-alibertarian-defense-of-private-property.html [https://perma.cc/Q8ZY-KCVJ].
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This essay posits that Justice Sotomayor is the Court’s chief defender
of the Fourth Amendment and the cherished values it protects. She has
consistently defended Fourth Amendment freedoms—in majority,
concurring, and especially in dissenting opinions. Part I recounts a few of
her majority opinions in Fourth Amendment cases. Part II examines her
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones. Part III examines several of
her dissenting opinions in Fourth Amendment cases.
A review of these opinions demonstrates what should be clear to any
observer of the Supreme Court: Justice Sotomayor consistently defends
Fourth Amendment principles and values.
I. MAJORITY OPINIONS
A. Collins v. Virginia
In her majority opinion in Collins v. Virginia, Sotomayor held that a
police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless
search of a motorcycle parked in the driveway of the defendant’s home.
Two police officers on separate occasions had observed an orange and
black motorcycle breaking the speed limit, but neither officer was able to
apprehend the driver of the motorcycle.10
The officers compared notes and determined that both incidents
involved the same motorcycle.11 The officers learned the motorcycle was
likely stolen and was now in Ryan Collins’ possession. One of the officers
discovered on Facebook that the motorcycle was parked at the top of a
house’s driveway.12 The officer, without a warrant, went to the driveway
of the home, where Collins’ girlfriend lived, and saw the bike covered with
a tarp in the driveway.13 The officer walked up, pulled off the tarp, took a
picture of the motorcycle, and then returned to his squad car.14
The officer then saw Collins return home and knocked on the door.15
Collins answered and, upon questioning, admitted that he bought the
motorcycle without title.16 A grand jury indicted Collins for receiving
stolen property.17 He filed a motion to suppress the evidence resulting from

10. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1668–69.
17. Id. at 1669.
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the warrantless search of the bike.18 “The trial court denied the motion and
Collins was convicted.”19
Both the Virginia Court of Appeals and Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, though on different grounds. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that the police officer had probable cause to believe that
the motorcycle under the tarp was the same motorcycle that had eluded
officers.20 The Virginia Supreme Court, on the other hand, reasoned that
the warrantless search was justified by the automobile exception to the
Fourth Amendment.21
Collins appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed his
conviction by an 8–1 vote. Writing for the majority, Sotomayor detailed
the history of both the automobile exception and the heightened Fourth
Amendment protection for the curtilage, the area right outside a home.22
According to Sotomayor, this was “an easy case.”23 She explained
that the automobile exception does not give “an officer the right to enter a
home or its curtilage to access a vehicle without a warrant.”24 The
automobile exception “is, after all, an exception for automobiles.”25 She
explained that “searching a vehicle parked in the curtilage involves not
only the invasion of the Fourth Amendment interest in the vehicle but also
an invasion of the sanctity of the curtilage.”26 She concluded that “the
automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter
a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein.” 27
B. City of Los Angeles v. Patel
Sotomayor also authored the Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles
v. Patel, a case involving a facial Fourth Amendment challenge to a city
ordinance, which empowered police officers to obtain guest information
from hotel operators upon demand.28 The ordinance provided that hotel
guest records “shall be made available to any officer of the Los Angeles
Police Department for inspection.”29
A group of hotel operators contended that the ordinance violated the
Fourth Amendment. A federal district court ruled that the hotel operators
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1669–70.
23. Id. at 1671.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1673.
26. Id. at 1672.
27. Id. at 1675.
28. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 412 (2015).
29. Id. at 413.
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lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.30 A divided
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, the en banc
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the ordinance unconstitutional.31
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor first explained that facial
challenges are permitted under the Fourth Amendment,32 noting that the
Court has invalidated other laws facially on Fourth Amendment grounds.
Specifically, she highlighted precedent that invalidated a Georgia law that
required candidates for state office to pass drug tests33 and a hospital policy
authorizing mandatory drug tests of pregnant women.34 Sotomayor
explained: “The Court’s precedents demonstrate not only that facial
challenges to statutes authorizing warrantless searches can be brought, but
also that they can succeed.”35
She then addressed the merits of the facial challenge, determining
that this type of administrative search requires the ability to obtain
“precompliance review before a neutral decisionmaker.”36 She noted
that the Los Angeles ordinance failed to provide any semblance of such
a review: “Absent an opportunity for precompliance review, the ordinance
creates an intolerable risk that searches authorized by it will
exceed statutory limits, or be used as a pretext to harass hotel operators
and their guests.”37
The city argued that it had a strong interest in the hotel guest records
to combat crime and that hotels are a “closely regulated” industry. 38 But,
Sotomayor explained that hotels have never been considered a closely
regulated industry like liquor stores, firearms dealers, or automobile
junkyards.39 She wrote: “To classify hotels as pervasively regulated would
permit what has always been a narrow exception to swallow the rule.”40
She cautioned that even if hotels somehow fell within the ambit of a
closely regulated industry, the Ordinance is still unconstitutional because
warrantless inspections are not necessary and the ordinance “fails
sufficiently to constrain police officers’ discretion as to which hotels to
search and under what circumstances.”41
30. Id. at 414.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 415.
33. Id. at 417 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1997)).
34. Id. (citing Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001)).
35. Id. at 418.
36. Id. at 420.
37. Id. at 421.
38. Id. at 424.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 424–25.
41. Id. at 427.
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C. Missouri v. McNeely
Justice Sotomayor once again protected Fourth Amendment
principles in Missouri v. McNeely, a drunk driving case in which a police
officer obtained a blood test without first obtaining a warrant. A police
officer stopped Tyler McNeely’s truck after observing it exceed the speed
limit and sway across the centerline of the road.42 McNeely performed
poorly on field sobriety tests and declined to take a breath test.43
The officer then placed McNeely under arrest and took him to a
nearby hospital for blood testing.44 For whatever reason, the officer
declined to obtain a warrant.45 McNeely refused to consent to the blood
test, but the officer directed the lab technician to perform the test, which
resulted in a blood alcohol content of 0.154 percent.46
Charged with driving while intoxicated, McNeely moved to suppress
the results of the warrantless blood test as a Fourth Amendment
violation.47 The trial court granted the motion, finding that there was no
emergency exception to the warrant requirement in the facts of this case.48
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, holding that this was “a routine DWI
case” and not an emergency.49
Sotomayor, writing for a majority and at times a plurality of the
Court, noted that whether there were exigent circumstances dissipating the
need for a warrant before blood testing must be judged under the totality
of the circumstances.50 The state of Missouri argued for a per se rule
for warrantless blood testing in drunk driving cases, but the majority
was unpersuaded.51 While Sotomayor recognized that the body’s natural
metabolic processes do dissipate alcohol in the body, she noted that
this would generally require a “significant delay” from the time of the
arrest to the test.52
She explained that “[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can
be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search,
the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”53 She determined
that “[w]hether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect
42. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 145–46.
45. Id. at 146.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 147 (quoting State v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 74 (2012)).
50. Id. at 149.
51. Id. at 151.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id.
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is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality
of the circumstances.”54
She reasoned that this rule did not undermine drunk-driving
enforcement efforts and noted that, in many states, there are restrictions
on nonconsensual blood testing.55 She concluded: “We hold that in drunkdriving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream
does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify
conducting a blood test without a warrant.”56
II. CONCURRING OPINIONS
A. United States v. Jones
In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that government
officials violated the Fourth Amendment by attaching a global positioning
system (GPS) device under a defendant’s vehicle. The majority opinion,
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia, noted that the government “physically
occupied private property” by attaching the GPS device to the car.57
Scalia reasoned that the government trespassed upon private property with
its actions.58
Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, noting that “the Fourth
Amendment is not concerned only with trespassory intrusions on
property,” and that “physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms
of surveillance.”59 In other words, she reasoned that Scalia’s trespass
theory of the Fourth Amendment was too limited60 and preferred to
consider the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test enunciated by Justice
John Marshall Harlan II’s concurring opinion in Katz v. United States.61
The Katz test is an often-used formulation that has been called “a great

54. Id. at 156.
55. Id. at 162.
56. Id. at 165.
57. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
58. Id. at 406.
59. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 415. While she disagreed with Justice Scalia’s approach, she praised his defense of
Fourth Amendment values in a tribute, even stating that “United States v. Jones is forefront in my
mind when I think of Justice Scalia.” Sonia Sotomayor, A Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 126 YALE
L.J. 1609, 1610 (2017).
61. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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touchstone in the law of privacy”62 that has become “synonymous” with
the Katz decision.63
She also questioned the viability of the third-party doctrine in Fourth
Amendment law—the idea that persons have no reasonable expectation of
privacy if they voluntarily provide the information to a third party.64 She
wrote: “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”65
Sotomayor also warned that the governmental surveillance employed
in this type of case could have harmful impacts on a person’s associational
freedoms, writing: “Awareness that the government may be watching
chills associational and expressive freedoms.”66 Fourth Amendment
experts lauded her for this insight.67
III. DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Utah v. Strieff
In this decision, the Supreme Court relied on the attenuation doctrine
to avoid applying the exclusionary rule even though the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of an individual.68
An anonymous call to police claimed that “narcotics activity” was
occurring at a particular residence.69 A police officer then conducted
intermittent surveillance of the residence and saw many visitors arrive at
the residence and then depart after only a few minutes.70
One notable visitor was Edward Strieff.71 The police observed Strieff
leave the residence and go to a convenience store.72 The officer detained

62. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
63. Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13,
21 (2009).
64. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 418.
66. Id. at 416.
67. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Policing Police Access to Criminal Justice Data, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 619, 657 (2019) (“The broader societal implications of this authority are no less consequential.”);
Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have Nine Lives?, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 116, 165 (2012) (“It is the larger, and more universal issues of non-trespassory
surveillance, and particularly privacy protection of information voluntarily disclosed to third parties,
that cause greater concern for Justice Sotomayor.”).
68. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060–61 (2016).
69. Id. at 2059.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2060.
72. Id.
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Strieff in the parking lot and had him produce identification.73
After relaying the information to a police dispatcher, the officer learned
that Strieff had an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. 74
Consequently, the officer placed Strieff under arrest, searched him, and
found illegal drugs.75
Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the majority, reasoned that
the valid arrest warrant broke the causal chain between the unlawful stop
and the discovery of the illegal drugs.76 Thomas further reasoned that
the arrest warrant was valid and was “entirely unconnected with the
stop.”77 Thomas went on to write that “there is no indication that this
unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”78
He ruled that “the evidence discovered on Strieff’s person was admissible
because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing
arrest warrant.”79
Sotomayor wrote a blistering dissent that Professor Josephine Ross
described as “literary and searing.”80 Others called it “epic,”81 “headlinegrabbing,”82 “thundering,”83 and “scorching.”84 It began with oft-quoted
language: “The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an
unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your
Fourth Amendment rights.”85 She continued: “This case allows the police
to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for
outstanding traffic warrants—even if you are doing nothing wrong.”86

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2063.
77. Id. at 2062.
78. Id. at 2063.
79. Id.
80. Josephine Ross, Warning: Stop-and-Frisk May Be Hazardous to Your Health, 25 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 689, 691 (2016).
81. John Nichols, Sonia Sotomayor’s Epic Dissent Explains What’s at Stake When the Police
Don’t Follow the Law, THE NATION (June 20, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/
sonia-sotomayors-epic-dissent-shows-why-we-need-people-of-color-on-the-supreme-court/ [https://
perma.cc/5F6L-XCHE].
82. Tal Kastner, Policing Narrative, 71 SMU L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2018).
83. Matt Ford, Justice Sotomayor’s Ringing Dissent, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/utah-streiff-sotomayor/487922/ [https://perma.
cc/F47R-DGPQ].
84. Irin Carmon, Sotomayor Issues Scathing Dissent in Fourth Amendment Case, NBC NEWS
(June 20, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sotomayor-issues-scathing-dissent-fourth
amendment-case-n595786 [https://perma.cc/SS7Y-GV7X].
85. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
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She openly discussed the topic of race, something regularly missing
from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.87 She cited such luminaries as
W.E.B. DuBois, James Baldwin, Michelle Alexander, and Ta-Nehisi
Coates.88 On race, Sotomayor wrote: “For generations, black and brown
parents have given their children ‘the talk’—instructing them never to run
down the street; always keep your hands where they can be seen; do not
even think of talking back to a stranger—all out of fear of how an officer
with a gun will react to them.”89
She noted that many might forgive the police’s conduct in this case,
as the officer’s instincts were correct that Strieff was carrying
contraband.90 But, “a basic principle lies at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment: Two wrongs don’t make a right.”91
Sotomayor added that “the officer’s sole purpose was to fish for
evidence.”92 She also emphasized that many people have outstanding
warrants, giving the example that 16,000 of 21,000 people in Ferguson,
Missouri, had such warrants.93 She warned that the majority’s decision
gives license to law enforcement to treat “members of our communities as
second-class citizens.”94
She also warned that “many innocent people are subjected to
the humiliations of these unconstitutional searches,” adding that “it is
no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of this type
of scrutiny.”95
B. Heien v. North Carolina
Sotomayor authored a lone dissent in Heien v. North Carolina, a case
involving a vehicle stop wherein the police officer made a mistake of law.
The officer stopped a vehicle after noticing that it had only one operable
brake light, despite North Carolina law permitting the operation of
vehicles with only one working brake light.96 The defendant, who had
illegal drugs in the car, filed a motion to suppress and argued that the initial
vehicle stop was unlawful.97

87. See Ross, supra note 80.
88. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2070 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2065.
91. Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
92. Id. at 2067.
93. Id. at 2068.
94. Id. at 2069.
95. Id. at 2070.
96. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57–59 (2014).
97. Id.
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When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
determined that the officer acted reasonably even though he was
mistaken about state law.98 Chief Justice John G. Roberts concluded,
“[B]ecause the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop.” 99
Sotomayor dissented, once again emphasizing that traffic stops
can become frightening and humiliating.100 She wrote that “permitting
mistakes of law to justify seizures has the perverse effect of preventing
or delaying the clarification of the law.”101 She concluded that “an
officer’s mistake of law, no matter how reasonable, cannot support
the individualized suspicion necessary to justify a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.”102
She also was the only justice to mention the troubling issue of race
in the case.103
C. Mitchell v. Wisconsin
Recall that Sotomayor authored the Court’s majority opinion in
Missouri v. McNeely, holding that there was no categorical exception to
the warrant requirement for blood draws of suspected drunk drivers.104 The
Court in Mitchell returned to this issue with a different twist—a blood
draw from an unconscious driver.105 An officer with the Sheboygan Police
Department received a report that Gerald Mitchell climbed into a van
while drunk and drove away.106 The officer found Mitchell wandering
around, out of the van, near a lake.107 The officer gave Mitchell a
preliminary breath test, which he failed miserably with a 0.24 percent.108
The officer who had arrested Mitchell could not conduct a more
reliable breath test at the police station because Mitchell was too lethargic,
so he drove Mitchell to a nearby hospital for a blood test.109 Mitchell lost
consciousness on the way and had to be wheeled into the hospital.110 The
98. Id. at 67.
99. Id. at 68.
100. Id. at 73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968)).
101. Id. at 74.
102. Id. at 80.
103. See Vivian M. Rivera, Note, When the Police Get the Law Wrong: How Heien v. North
Carolina Further Erodes the Fourth Amendment, 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 314 (2016).
104. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
105. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2525 (2019).
106. Id. at 2532.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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officer had hospital staff conduct a blood test on the unconscious Mitchell
without the officer first obtaining a warrant.111
Mitchell later challenged the warrantless blood test results on Fourth
Amendment grounds.112 The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that, with
unconscious drivers, police officers often can rely on the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.113 Writing for a
plurality, Justice Alito explained that in cases involving unconscious
drivers, “the need for a blood test is compelling, and an officer’s duty to
attend to more pressing needs may leave no time to seek a warrant.”114 He
determined that there is a compelling need for the blood test because the
unconscious cannot perform a breath test.115 He also noted that oftentimes
with unconscious drivers, the police may have to assist other injured
drivers, provide first aid, or even deal with fatalities.116 The plurality, thus,
remanded the case back to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to give the
government an opportunity to make the case for exigent circumstances.117
Sotomayor dissented, writing that the rule from McNeely should
apply, and the police should obtain a warrant before drawing blood. 118 To
her, “the answer is clear: If there is time, get a warrant.”119 She reiterated
that “there is no categorical exigency exception for blood draws.”120
Sotomayor also explained that technological advances have made
obtaining warrants a more expedited process.121
She also noted the irony in the plurality emphasizing that police
officers may have other pressing needs, such as aiding other drivers,
because “the police encountered Mitchell alone, after he had parked and
left his car.”122 She concluded: “The Fourth Amendment . . . requires
police officers seeking to draw blood from a person suspected of drunk
driving to get a warrant if possible. That rule should resolve this case.”123
D. Kansas v. Glover
In this decision, the Court ruled that a police officer did not violate
the Fourth Amendment when he pulled over a vehicle assuming—but not
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2533
114. Id. at 2535.
115. Id. at 2537.
116. Id. at 2538.
117. Id. at 2539.
118. Id. at 2541 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 2544.
121. Id. at 2548.
122. Id. at 2550.
123. Id.
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knowing—that the driver of the vehicle was the owner of the
automobile.124 A sheriff’s deputy in Douglas County, Kansas, observed a
1995 pick-up truck while on routine patrol.125 He ran the license plate and
learned the owner of the vehicle was Charles Glover Jr. who had a revoked
driver’s license.126 The deputy assumed that Glover was the driver of the
vehicle and pulled the vehicle over.127 The driver was indeed Glover, and
he was charged as a habitual violator.128
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that the deputy
made a “commonsense inference” that Glover likely was the operator
of the vehicle.129 He also noted that “empirical studies” show that many
persons with revoked driver licenses “frequently continue to drive.”130
He explained: “The inference that the driver of a car is its registered
owner does not require any specialized training; rather, it is a
reasonable inference made by ordinary people on a daily basis.”131
These commonsense judgments, according to Thomas, made the
stop reasonable.132
Sotomayor filed another solitary dissent, writing that the Court
“ignores key foundations of our reasonable-suspicion jurisprudence and
impermissibly and unnecessarily reduces the State’s burden of proof.”133
She emphasized that the “State bears the burden of justifying a seizure.”134
She also noted that suspicion generally “must be individualized.”135
According to Sotomayor, the majority filled in the gaps of the
reasonable suspicion inquiry “with its own ‘common sense,’” thus
“allowing judges to offer their own brand of common sense where the
State’s proffered justifications for a search come up short also shifts police
work to the judiciary.”136
Sotomayor concluded: “Before subjecting motorists to this
type of investigation, the State must possess articulable facts
and officer inferences to form suspicion.”137 She concluded that the
124. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1188.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1189.
132. Id. at 1191.
133. Id. at 1194 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1195.
136. Id. at 1196.
137. Id. at 1198.
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Court “destroys Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that requires
individualized suspicion.”138
E. Messerschmidt v. Millender
In this decision, the Court ruled that Los Angeles County officers
were entitled to qualified immunity for their broad search of a home for
weapons related to a domestic dispute.139 Shelly Kelly broke off her
relationship with Jerry Ray Bowen, who was an active member of a local
street gang, and Kelly called the sheriff’s department to help gather her
belongings at her and Bowen’s residence.140 Once the officers left, Bowen
appeared at the home, yelled at Kelly, cursed her, and tried to throw her
over the second-floor balcony.141 Bowen even fired a gun at Kelly as she
sped away from the residence.142 Kelly reported the assault to the police.143
Detective Curt Messerschmidt, assigned to the case, learned that
Bowen may have been staying at the home of seventy-year-old Augusta
Millender, Bowen’s foster mother.144 The detective also learned that
Bowen had been arrested at least thirty-one times, many of those instances
being firearms related.145 Based on this information, Messerschmidt drew
up a broad search warrant for all firearms or gang-related material that
may be at Millender’s residence.146 Law enforcement served the warrant a
few days later at Millender’s home.147
Law enforcement did not find Bowen at the residence but did seize
Millender’s shotgun and a box of .45-caliber ammunition.148 The police
found Bowen two weeks later at a motel.149 The Millenders filed a lawsuit
against the sheriff’s department, the county of Los Angeles, and the
individual sheriff’s deputies, including Messerschmidt.150 The key
question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity.151
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, in part because “[a]
138. Id.
139. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 539 (2012).
140. Id. at 540.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 540–41.
145. Id. at 541.
146. Id. at 541–42.
147. Id. at 543.
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151. Id. at 544–45.
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reasonable officer also could believe that seizure of the firearms was
necessary to prevent further assaults on Kelly.”152 It also was not
unreasonable that Bowen owned multiple weapons.153
A reasonable officer might believe that evidence showing Bowen’s
gang affiliation “might prove helpful in impeaching Bowen or rebutting
various defenses he could raise at trial.”154 Roberts also noted that
Messerschmidt’s affidavit was approved by a superior officer and a deputy
district attorney.155 Thus, according to Roberts, the warrant was not “so
obviously defective that no reasonable officer could have believed it was
valid.”156 Instead, the officer could have believed—based on all the
facts—that the warrant was proper and entitled to qualified immunity. 157
Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, characterizing the warrant
as a “general warrant.”158 She wrote that “this kind of general warrant is
antithetical to the Fourth Amendment.”159 Further, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not permit the police to search for evidence solely
because it could be admissible for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.”160
Sotomayor also noted that “merely possessing . . . firearms is not a crime
at all” and characterized the majority’s analysis as “akin to a rational-basis
test” instead of a more traditional qualified-immunity analysis.161
She concluded that “it is not objectively reasonable for
police investigating a specific, non-gang related assault committed
with a particular firearm” to search for all evidence of gang activity and
all firearms.162
CONCLUSION
Justice Sonia Sotomayor has demonstrated—time and time
again—her commitment to Fourth Amendment principles. More than any
other justice on either the so-called conservative or liberal wings of the
Court, she holds government officials’ feet to the fire in search and seizure
cases. Her record on Fourth Amendment cases shows that she is an ardent
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and consistent defender of individual privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
For example, she requires the government to generally obtain a
warrant before conducting blood tests of suspected drunk drivers. 163
She recognizes that a person’s home and curtilage are entitled to
enhanced privacy protections.164 She requires the government to have
individualized suspicion before conducting traffic stops. 165 She
understands that police stops can be particularly terrifying—particularly
to those from communities that have a less-than-ideal relationship with
law enforcement.166
She would not grant qualified immunity when police officers write
clearly overbroad search warrant affidavits.167 She believes that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy that can be infringed
by the government’s use of technology.168
Her Fourth Amendment record shows President Obama was
prescient in proclaiming that her perspective would make her “an
invaluable” member of the Supreme Court.169
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